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Abstract
There exists a large consensus in the economic literature and in the economic institutions
about the legitimacy of policies subsidizing education. This legitimacy lies in the fact that
education is a source of positive externalities. In a standard framework of endogenous
fertility, the present paper shows that this result is still valid but that subsidizing education
also requires to tax births. Indeed, education subsidies decrease the net cost of children such
that parents can exhibit a too high fertility rate. Furthemore, when health is introduced as
another source of externalities, the model shows that health expenditures have not always to
be subsidized. Indeed, the taxation of births plays the role of an indirect subsidy on health
expenditures because it decreases the cost of health relatively to the cost of the quantity
of children. When the externalities on education are very high relatively to the positive
externalities on health, the indirect subsidy on health can exceed the subsidy that is really
needed. Then health expenditures have to be taxed.
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1 Introduction
There exists a large consensus in the economic literature and in the economic institutions
about the legitimacy of policies subsidizing education. This legitimacy lies in the fact that
education is a source of positive externalities [Hanushek & Welch (2006)]. The present paper
uses a standard framework of endogenous fertility. It shows that this result is still valid but
that subsidizing education also requires to tax births. Indeed, education subsidies decrease
the net cost of children such that parents can exhibit a too high fertility rate. Following this
result, health is introduced as another source of positive externalities because it reduces the
child mortality. The model shows that, despite their status of positive externality, health
expenditures have not always to be subsidized. Indeed, the taxation of births plays the role of
an indirect subsidy on health expenditures because it decreases the cost of health relatively
to the cost of the quantity of children. In order to reach the same number of surviving
children, parents tend to have less children in better health. When the externalities on
education are very high, the tax on births has also to be high. If the positive externalities
on health are low, the indirect subsidy can exceed the subsidy that is really needed. Then
health expenditures have to be taxed.
The "standard framework" of endogenous fertility comes from the seminal works of Becker
et Al [1973,1976,1988]. It consists in a model where parents value the number of their
o¤springs (quantity) as well as their future human capital (quality). They maximize their
expected utility subject to a non linear budget constraint2. Then a trade-o¤ between quality
and quantity takes place. This fundamental contribution of Becker has been followed by
major improvements of Galor & Al [1999, 2002], De la Croix & Doepke [2003], Kalemli-
Ozcan [2003], etc, resulting in a unied framework. Surprisingly there exist very few studies
exploring the optimality properties of fertility behaviors in this unied framework.
The question of optimal fertility has been studied in other frameworks. Samuelson [1975],
Deardor¤ [1976] and Michel & Pestieau [1993] explore the question of the optimal population
growth rate in an overlapping generation model with exogenous fertility. A model with
endogenous fertility has been proposed by Michel & Wigniolle [2007] and generalized by
2This non linearity is fundamental in models of trade-o¤ between quality and quantity. Because quality
is provided to each child (with or without equity), its cost crucially depends on the quantity choices. Then
the parental budget constraint is no more linear.
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Golosov et Al [2007]. Their interest focuses on the Pareto optimality of equilibria. However,
they do not deal neither with the quality-quantity trade-o¤ nor with the question of optimal
family policies.
Groezen et Al [2003] proposes a model of endogenous fertility and deals with the question
of optimal family policies. He argues that, in presence of a Pay As You Go (PAYG) pension
system, children are a source of positive externalities because their marginal production
will nance the pension system. It implies that the competitive fertility rate is too low, a
child allowance has to be implemented3. However, if there is no PAYG pension system, the
competitive fertility is optimal. Groezen et Al do not deal with the trade-o¤ between quality
and quantity what partly causes this last result.
The present paper is more closely related to contributions of Spiegel [1993] and Balestrino
et Al [2000]. They both deal with optimal scal schemes in a problem of trade-o¤ between
quality and quantity. Their main result is that a taxation of births can constitute an optimal
family policy4. This result crucially comes from the assumption that the Social Planner tries
to reduce inequities5. In these models, a tax on births is an e¢ cient instrument to reduce
inequities.
In the present paper, a completing approach is proposed. Child mortality is taken into
account. Moreover the existence of births taxing is not conditioned neither on the existence of
di¤erences between the government objective and the parental preferences nor on a problem
of inobservability of behaviors6. Indeed, even when the preference of the Social Planner are
3Loupias & Wigniolle [2004] show that, in a closed framework, a generalized Allais-Samuelson-Diamond
golden rule can be reached only if fertility is subsidized.
4Boulding [1964] proposed to implement a market of tradable procreation rights. This idea is explored by
De la Croix & Gosseries [2007]. It nally consists in a system of tax or subsidy on the quantity of children.
However they do not explain the reasons why governments are not satised with their national fertility. In
that sense, the present paper has to be considered as a complement to this literature.
5Balestrino et Al propose a model of optimal taxation where parents are heterogenous. Parental choices
are all Pareto e¢ cient. However the government is characterized by a Benthamite function of Social Welfare,
then it tries to reduce welfare inequalities between groups of parents. Moreover this government faces a
mimicking problem à la Stiglitz (the workforce participations are not observable). Fertility being observable,
taxing births can help the government to identify parents that are really poor from mimickers. Another
enlightening contribution comes from Cigno and Pettini [2002] who nd a similar result without mimicking
problems.
Spiegel [1993] proposes a model of trade-o¤ between quality and quantity with a Rawlsian social planner.
He shows that a poll tax on births enables to decentralize the social optimum of the economy. However that
instrument is a perfect substitute to a tax on the second period consumption.
6In the Spiegels framework, if the government does not value welfare inequalities, no tax on births is
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identical to the preferences of parents, a tax on child births is required.
The models main assumption consists in the existence of externalities in the human cap-
ital accumulation7. When parents choose their optimal trade-o¤ between quality and quan-
tity, they do not consider that their education investment will improve the overall e¢ ciency
of the human capital accumulation process. It implies that, at the competitive equilibrium,
they tend to under-invest in education. Then, an optimal economic policy consists in the
implementation of a subsidy on education spending. However, the budget constraint of the
standard model of trade-o¤ between quality and quantity is not linear. It implies that re-
ducing the costs of quality also reduces the net cost of quantity. In consequence, when it is
optimal to subsidize education, it is also optimal to tax births. This central result is robust
to the introduction of a natalist bias in the social planners preferences and to the extension
to endogenous child mortality.
The introduction of endogenous child mortality is important in order to discuss some
evidence on Family Planning Programs in which the health enhancement is one major issue.
In the extended model, higher parental health expenditures reduce child mortality. Further-
more, the average level of health spending has a negative impact on the child mortality. The
literature of development economics provides strong evidence that the overall health quality
is one of the main determinant of the individual health quality. For example, Dasgupta
[1993] shows that 45 percent of all deaths in developing countries can be imputed to infec-
tious and parasitic disease. Private health expenditures help reduce the probability to be
a¤ected when an agent is in contact with diseases. Then a higher average level of health ex-
penditures reduces the death probability in all the families. This positive externality implies
that private health expenditures are too low at the competitive equilibrium.
In this extended framework, reaching optimality requires, once again, to subside edu-
cation and to tax births. The taxation of births plays the role of an indirect subsidy on
health expenditures. Indeed, it increases the cost of quantity relatively to the cost of health.
Parents tend to increase their health expenditures and to decrease the number of births
to reach the same number of surviving children. Then, for strong externalities on health
required. In Balestrino et al, even if the social planner dislikes welfare inequalities, the observability of
abilities would make the individual indirect utilites observable. Then lump sum transfers would ensure an
optimal redistribution of welfare. No tax on births would be necessary.
7This is in line with Galor et Al [1999, 2002], De la Croix & Doepke [2003], Kalemli-Ozcan [2003] etc.
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expenditures, the indirect tax will not be su¢ cient to reach optimal health expenditures at
the competitive equilibrium. So private health expenditures have to be subsidized.
The recommendation to tax births in complement to subsidies for education and health,
can be analyzed in the light of some empirical evidence. China and Sub-Saharan African
countries, at least, face a problem of overpopulation. They both implement alternative
strategies to reduce fertility. China experiments a specic scal scheme on births that subsi-
dizes the rst birth and strongly taxes the subsequent ones. However, empirical studies like
Kanbur & Zhang [2003] and Fan & Zhang [2000] show that investments in education and
health are insu¢ cient in China. The present paper proposes an alternative scal scheme that
would reallocate public funds from the rst births subsidy to the promotion of education
and health, without loss of e¢ ciency in births control.
Sub-Saharan African countries have implemented several family planning programs which
strongly promote investments in health and education. However, a recent report of the World
Bank [2007] shows that this policy has been ine¢ cient in reducing the net fertility rate in a
large majority of these countries. The paper argues that these policies have been ine¢ cient
because they did not increase the relative cost of quantity. It shows that more attention
should be paid to the implementation of a scal scheme that would explicitly sanction births.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the benchmark model is
presented. Its recommendations in term of family policies are discussed. In section 3, en-
dogenous child mortality and public health expenditures are introduced. Section 4 discusses
the papers empirical implications for China and Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Benchmark model
2.1 The Competitive Equilibrium
The model consists in an overlapping generation economy with Lt agents who live for two
periods: childhood and adulthood. During childhood, an agent receives education from his
parent and does not consume. When he becomes adult, he has to choose his consumption
level Ct, the number of his children Nt and their education et. For simplicity, families are
monoparental. Parents exhibit altruism for their children in the sense that they value their
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future human capital. The parental utility function is noted:
ut = U (Ct; Nt; ht+1) (1)
U (:; :; :) is strictly increasing and concave in its arguments.
Nt denotes the number of children born in the family and  2]0; 1[ denotes the fraction
of children who survive to age ve. The model assumes that parents value the number of
surviving children and not the number of children born. It implies that a high child mortality
rate is a source of disutility.  is exogenous in this section but will be endogenized thereafter.
There is no uncertainty about the reproductive success of a family8.
Finally, ht+1 represents the human capital in t+1 of an adult born in t9. Following De la
Croix & Doepke [2003], parents nance a schooling time et and the average human capital
of teachers equals the average human capital in the population. There exists an intrafamily
transmission of human capital: the human capital of parents ht positively inuences the
future human capital of children. Because parents do not decide of their own human capital
level, the transmission of human capital into the family is an externality. Moreover, the
average level of human capital in the population has a positive impact on the childrens
future human capital. This second externality represents the inuence of the e¢ ciency of
the school system (ht is the professorsproductivity) and the presence of peer e¤ects. Human
capital is accumulated through the following process10:
ht+1 = f
 
et; ht; ht

; f 01 > 0; f
00
11  0; f 02 > 0; f 0022 < 0; f 03 > 0; f 0033  0; (2)
The function f is strictly increasing and concave regarding education investments. Note
that, following equation (2) ; et can be expressed as a function of ht; ht and ht+1 such
that: et = e
 
ht+1; ht; ht

and e01 > 0; e
0
2 < 0; e
0
3 < 0:
The maximization of utility is subject to the following budget constraint:
Ct +



+ 

wthtXt + wtht
 (Xt)  et = wtht (3)
8So, contrary to the models of Sah [1991] and Kalemli-Ozcan [2003] that assume uncertainty, parents will
not overshoot their number of children to ensure the compliance of their optimal fertility rate. Because a
child death is assumed to occur before age ve, parents can rapidly ensure the replacement of dead children.
9As in Becker [1976], Galor & Al [1999,2002], De la Croix & Doepke [2003] and Kalemli Ozcan [2003]
the paper assumes that parents directly value the future human capital of their children. They do not value
their future well being. In other words, altruism is limited to one generation.
10Notice that for all function  (1; 2; ::::; n; ::::);  0n represents the partial derivative of   with regard to
n:
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Xt  Nt represents the number of surviving children at the end of period t. Each child born
takes a part  2 ]0; 1[ of its parents time allocation that is normalized to one: Moreover
each surviving child consumes an extra part  of this time11. Then the quantity cost of a
surviving child is greater than the cost of a non surviving child. The total cost of quantity is
equal to
h


+ 
i
wthtXt. It includes the ine¤ective costs engaged for non surviving children.
Consequently it negatively depends on the child survival rate.
The cost of one unit of education is not a¤ected by the variations in the child mortality
rate. Indeed, no education investment is engaged until a child reaches age ve. The total
cost of education is concave in Xt; one unit of education can benet to more than one child.
Then wtht
 (Xt)  et represents the cost of giving et units of education to Xt children with

0(Xt)  0 and 
00(Xt)  0: If education is a pure public good in the family (
(Xt) = 1),
providing et units of education to one child implies the same cost as providing et units to
Xt children. If education is a pure private good in the family (
(Xt) = Xt) , one unit of
education benets to only one child. Then the total cost of education equals the unitarian
cost of education times the number of surviving children.
The price of the nal good is normalized to one. It is produced in quantity Yt, following
a linear technology:
Yt = AHt (4)
A is a productivity factor and Ht is the total amount of human capital in the workforce. At
the labor markets equilibrium, Ht is:
Ht =

1 



+ 

Xt   et
 (Xt)

htLt (5)
Note that, ex-post, at the equilibrium of the labor market, ht = ht: The workforce par-
ticipation of a parent consists in his remaining time after childbearing and professors do
not participate to the production of the nal good. Furthermore, as the labor market is
competitive, the wage equals the workersmarginal productivity:
wt = A (6)
A parent born in t  1 determines his optimal demands  Ct ; Xt ; ht+1 by maximizing ut =
11Note that  +  < 1:  > 0 is a scalar that allows the relative education costs to vary.
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U (Ct; Xt; ht+1) with respect to Ct; Xt and ht+112 subject to (2) and (3) : This problem can
be solved by maximizing the objective function Vt (Xt; ht+1) with respect to Xt and ht+1 :
Vt (Xt; ht+1)  U

wtht  



+ 

wthtXt   wtht
 (Xt) e
 
ht+1; ht; ht

; Xt; ht+1

(7)
To ensure the global concavity of the problem, the Hessian Matrix of the problem is
assumed to be positive semi-denite:
The competitive equilibrium is described by the set

Ct ; X

t ; e

t ; h

t ; h

t ; h

t+1; H

t ; Y

t ; w

t
	
satisfying equations (2) ; (3) ; (4) ; (5) ; (6) and the following First Order Conditions:
U 0X =



+ + 
0 (Xt ) e
 
ht+1; h

t ; h

t

AhtU
0
C (8)
U 0ht+1
U 0C
= Aht
 (X

t ) e
0
1
 
ht+1; h

t ; h

t

(9)
At the competitive equilibrium, ht = h

t , there is no inequality of human capital. The
existence of externalities on the human capital accumulation implies that the competitive
equilibrium cannot be optimal. The next section derives the social optimum of the economy
and compares it to the competitive equilibrium.
2.2 The Social Optimum
The presence of externalities makes the private choices on education ine¢ cient. Parents do
not consider the positive e¤ect of their educational investments on the overall e¢ ciency of
human capital accumulation. Consequently, they naturally tend to under invest in education.
Intuitively, the implementation of a subsidy on education should be su¢ cient to correct this
distortion. The equilibrium would be ensured by the existence of a lump sum tax on incomes.
However, doing so implicitly assumes that education is a pure public good into the family
and that the objective of the Social Planner is the same as the objective of the representative
agent.
Dening the Social Planners objective function is not straightforward. The present paper
does not deal with equity objectives. The Social Planner want to maximize the agentsutility.
The crucial point lies in his preference for the size of populations.
12Note that, ht+1 depends on the familial human capital, the average human capital and educational
choices of parents. As parents know the level of ht and ht when they determine et; choosing et is equivalent
to choosing ht+1.
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One representation of the Social Planners preferences is usual when fertility is endoge-
nous. In this representation, the Social Planner tries to maximize the utility of the repre-
sentative agent13 U (C;X; h). Doing so implies that he is interested in the well-being of the
representative agent without taking care of the size of the population enjoying U (C;X; h) :
In the present model, the Social Planner takes care of the size of the generations enjoying
U (C;X; h) : To do so, a natalist bias is introduced in his preferences. The Social Welfare
function, at the steady state, is then:
SU = f (X)U (C;X; h) (10)
This formulation is a generalization of the usual case where f (X) = 1. f (X) represents
the "Social Planners Natalist Bias". For a given X, a higher value of f(X) means that
the Social planner exhibits a higher natalist bias. In other words, ceteris paribus, he prefers
larger generations. f(X) is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave in X14. f 0 (X) > 0
simply means that distributing U to one agent is less valuable than distributing U to X > 1
agents. f 00 (X) < 0 ensures the existence of the trade-o¤ between the utility distributed to
the representative agent and the size of the generation enjoying it.
Then, the Social Planner maximizes (10) subject to the following resource constraint:
C =

1 



+ 

X   
 (X) e

Ah (11)
The optimal steady state is described by the set
n bC; bX;bho satisfying equation (11) and
the following First Order Conditions:
U 0X =  
f 0
 bX
f
 bX U
 bC; bX;bh+ 

+ + 
0
 bX ebh;bh;bhAbhU 0C (12)
U 0ht+1
U 0C
= A
 bX 

+ 

+ 

 bX hebh;bh;bh+ bh (be01 + be02 + be03)i  1 (13)
Obviously, at the optimal steady state, all the existing externalities are taken into ac-
count.
13See Groezen et Al [2003], Wigniolle & Loupias [2004], Zhang [2003], Zhang & Zhang [2007], etc. This
formulation can also be included in the A-E¢ ciency problems from Golosov et Al [2007].
14Let H(W ) be the Hessian matrix of the social planners objective function Wt =
f (Xt)U
 
1   Nt   + e ht+1; ht; htXAh;Xt; ht+1 : To ensure global concavity H(W ) is assumed
to be positive semi-denite
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In this economy, externalities concern the accumulation of human capital. When parents
invest in education, they improve the future human capital of their children, such that, in
turn, they improve both the future average level of human capital in the economy and their
dynastys level of human capital. However parents do not take into account that positive
impact on the future e¢ ciency of the accumulation process. It implies that they tend to
underinvest in education.
Furthermore the preferences of parents di¤er from the preferences of the social planner.
Parents are not concerned with pro-natalism. Consequently they could make too few chil-
dren. However the externalities on education increase their fertility rate because quality and
quantity are substitutes. The competitive equilibrium can then be characterized by over or
under fertility. The implementation of an economic policy is required.
2.3 The Optimal Family Policy
In order to decentralize the social optimum, the government has to implement a public policy
which makes the competitive steady state15 converges to the optimal one. An optimal policy
makes the set fC; X; hg identical to the set
n bC; bX;bho : The following sub-sections discuss
the optimal family policies in the general case (
(X) 6= 1) and in the specic case where
education is a pure public good inside the family (
(X) = 1).
To summary, education choices are not optimal because there exist an externality on
education investments. A subsidy for education spending has to be implemented to correct
this externality. Fertility choices are not optimal for two reasons. First, the Social Planner
does not exhibit the same preferences for quantity as individuals. Second, when the cost
structure is not linear (
(X) 6= 1), the implementation of the education subsidy decreases
the total quantity costs. A tax or a subsidy on births has to be implemented. Obviously,
such a family policy will not be required in the specic case where the Social Planner exhibits
no Fertility Bias (f(X) = 1) and education is a pure public good in the family (
(X) = 1).
15At the competitive steady state, ht+1 = h

t = h

t :
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2.3.1 Optimal Family Policy in the general case
Proposition 1 Whatever the intensity of the Social Planners natalist bias, a policy of
education subsidies is optimal when it is completed with a family policy that can be either
a tax or a subsidy on births. The government budget constraint has to be balanced by the
implementation of a lump sum tax on each family.
Proof. The economic policy described in proposition 1 leads to the following competitive
steady state:
U 0X =

 + 

+ + 
0 (X)  (1  ) e (h; h; h)

AhU 0C (14)
U 0h
U 0C
= Ah
 (X) (1  ) e01 (h; h; h) (15)
C =

1 

 + 

+ 

X +  (1  ) e (h; h; h) 
 (X)

Ah   t (16)
t = e (h; h; h) 
 (X)Ah   

XAh (17)
 > 0 (resp  < 0) represents a tax (resp a subsidy) on each child birth.  > 0 (resp
 < 0) denotes a subsidy (resp a tax) on educational investments. When parents invest
in one unit of education, they only pay a part 1    of this investment. t is the lump
sum tax making the government budget constraint balanced. Equation (17) represents the
government budget constraint; equations (14) and (15) are just the expression of equations
(8) and (9) when the economic policy is implemented.
Observing systems f11; 12; 13g and f14; 15; 16; 17g ; any policy making the sub-systems
f14; 15g and f12; 13g identical, decentralizes the social optimum. Indeed, (16) and (17)
imply that (11) is satised. It follows that16:
b = 1  bX
h


+ 
i
  

 bX [be+ h (be02 + be03)]


 bXbhbe01 (18)b

=  f
0( bX)
f( bX) bUAbhbU 0C +

0( bX)be

( bX)bhbe01

1  bX 

+ 

  

 bX hbe+ bh (be02 + be03)i (19)
bt = "f( bX)bX bUbU 0C + Abebe01

1  "
( bX)bX

1  bX 

+ 

  

 bX hbe+ bh (be02 + be03)i (20)
16Notice that U  U
 bC; bX;bh and be = ebh;bh;bh :
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By (11); b can be expressed as:
b = bCAbh   

 bXh (be02 + be03)


 bXbhbe01
be02 + be03 < 0 implies that b is always positive. The optimal education policy is always a
subsidy. f 0( bX) and 
0  bX being di¤erent from zero, b and bt are also di¤erent from zero: a
family policy and a lump sum tax are e¤ectively required to reach the optimal steady state.
An education subsidy has to be implemented because the human capital accumulation
process is a¤ected by externalities. Parents under estimate the returns of education, then
they tend to under-invest in their childrens human capital. The optimal scal policy on
births has two determinants. The rst one is the Social Planners natalist bias. If the Social
Planner exhibits a strong preference for large populations, the competitive fertility rate is
too small. The second determinant of the optimal policy on births is the optimal education
policy itself. The non linearity of the parental budget constraint implies that a reduction
in the education costs reduces the total net cost of a surviving child. Then parents tend
to make more children. One main issue of that paper is to determine the condition where
births have to be taxed17.
Proposition 2 For low intensities of the Social Planners natalist bias such that 0 < "f(
bX)bX <e"; to tax births is an optimal family policy.
Proof. After some calculus on (19), the following condition can be obtained:
b

> 0, "f(X)X <
"
U(C;X;h)
C  "
(X)X
"eht+1

1  
(X)Ahe
C
h
"eht + "
e
ht
i
 e" (21)
"eht + "
e
ht
< 0 implies that e" > 0:
The value of e" is determined by the models key variables. When the elasticity of utility to
consumption ("U(C;X;h)C ) is high, parents tend to consume a great part of their income. They
17Let "p(m)m denotes the elasticity of p(m) with regard to m. So "
p(m)
m 
@p(m)
@m m
p(m) 8m and 8p() being twice
di¤erentiable.
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tend to have few children. Therefore, all other things being equal, the competitive fertility
rate is low and the tax level has not to be very high and could even become a subsidy18.
When the private returns of investment in human capital are high (low values of "eht+1)
relatively to its social returns ("eht+1  
h
"eht + "
e
ht
i
), the tax will be low. Indeed, this implies
that the distortions on education choices are low, so the educational subvention is low.
Because the tax on births correct the distortion provoked by the subsidy on education, its
level will be low too.
Corollary 3 When there is no di¤erence between the preferences of the Social Planner and
the preferences of individuals ("f(X)X = 0), the optimal family policy is necessary a tax on
births.
Proof. If "f(X)X = 0 , (21) is always satised.
Indeed, when the Social Planner has the same preferences as parents, initially, at the
competitive steady state, fertility behaviors are optimal. However, when the social planner
implements subsidies on education investments, the cost of quantity also decreases. Then
over fertility appears and a tax on births has to be implemented.
This result is crucial for models of trade-o¤ between quality and quantity. It implies that
leading generous education policies could require restrictive family policies when education
is not a pure public good in the family. The following sub-section explores the precedent
optimal scal scheme in the specic case where education is a pure public good inside the
family.
2.3.2 Optimal Family Policy when education is a pure public good in the family
In this case, the cost of providing et units of education to one child is the same as the cost
of providing et units of education to an innite number of children. It implies that the
precedent results are sensibly modied.
Proposition 4 When education is a pure public good in the family, taxing births is never
necessary to decentralize the optimal steady state. Furthermore, if the Social Planner does
not exhibit a Natalist Bias, no family policy is required to reach the optimal steady state.
18If the elasticity of utility to consumption is considered as an indicator of parental individualism, a society
with a strong individualism will need to subside births to reach the social optimum.
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Proof. If 
0(X) = 0; the scal scheme decentralizing the optimal steady state is the expres-
sion of system f18; 19; 20g with 
 (X) = 1 and 
0 (X) = 0:
b = 1  bX
h


+ 
i
   [be+ h (be02 + be03)]
bhbe01 (22)b

=  f
0( bX)
f( bX) UAbhU 0C (23)bt = "f( bX)bX UU 0C + Abebe01

1  bX 

+ 

  

 bX hbe+ bh (be02 + be03)i (24)
By the proof of proposition 3, b > 0. Education has to be subsidized. It is straightforward
that b  0: When f 0(X) = 0; it follows from (23) that b = 0, b > 0 and bt > 0:
The fundamental results of the model has not really changed. Equation (19) is still
satised, however the education policy does not distort fertility behaviors anymore. Indeed,
as education is a pure public good in the family, the total costs of education are not inuenced
by the number of children that enjoy the education investment. So only the distance between
the Social Planners preferences and the households preferences can make non optimal the
fertility behaviors. Without this bias, competitive fertility choices are optimal and no family
policy is required.
As a rst major result, in a standard model of trade-o¤ between quality and quantity, a
family policy is always required to reach the optimal steady state if education is not a pure
public good. In other words, without the implementation of a tax or a subsidy on births, an
education policy is not completely e¤ective. This result provides some incentives to modify
the nature of family planning programs which do not implement taxes or subsidies on births.
However, these programs do promote health expenditures. In the following section, the model
is extended to the existence of private health expenditures. The need to tax births will not
be canceled by the introduction of health expenditures.
3 Optimal family policy with health expenditures
The children survival probability is now endogenous. Parents can engage health expenditures
in order to reduce their childrens death probability. In line with Shakraborty [2004], the
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child survival probability t is now:
t   (st; st) (25)
The parental expenditures on health have a strictly positive and concave inuence on the
childrens survival probability, so 01  (st;st)st > 0 and 0011 
2(st;st)
st2
< 0: These expenditures
represent the health care provided by parents to children. Parental health care covers a large
set of expenditures like hygiene, sanitation improvements and e¢ cient nutrition. st denotes
the average health expenditures in the economy. In line with Dasgupta [1993], let assume
that 02  (st;st)st > 0 and 0022 
2(st;st)
st2
< 0:
The introduction of an externality on health expenditures implies that the parental
choices on st will not be e¢ cient at the competitive equilibrium. Intuitively, one can expect
that the competitive level of health expenditures will be inferior to its optimal level. How-
ever, the existence of educational ine¢ ciency could alter this result because, as previously,
it decreases the total cost of quantity.
3.1 The Competitive Equilibrium
Parents now have to determine health expenditures for their children. In other words, they
choose Xt and st. The addition of an externality on health spending implies that private
health investments will not be optimal. Then the government introduces a subsidy rt on
health expenditures in complement to the previous scal system. The government budget
constraint is now19:
tt = te (ht+1; ht; ht)Xtwtht   twtht
 (st; st)
Xt + rtst (26)
When the scal scheme is implemented, the familial budget constraint is:
Ct + (1  rt) st +

 + t
 (st; st)
+ 

wthtXt + (1  t) wthtXt  et = wtht (27)
Now the nal good can either be consumed or invested in health. Parents have to
maximize the objective function U (Ct; Xt; ht+1) with regard to Ct; Xt and ht+1 and with
respect to (27) :As health expenditures do not enter the objective function, parents determine
19To simplify the results, let assume 
0 (X) = 1: Education is a pure private good.
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their optimal health expenditures by minimizing (1  rt) st + +t(st;st)wthtXt: It follows that,
at the competitive steady state:
1  r = [ + ] 
0
1
[ (s; s)]2
Xwh (28)
Parents equalize the marginal return and the marginal cost of health expenditures (1 r).
The marginal benet of health expenditures

[+]01
[(s;s)]2X
wh

consists in the reduction of the
total cost of quantity20. In other words, the equation (28) determines the optimal parental
spending on health to have Xt surviving children.
The competitive steady state is now described by the set

C; X; s; e; h; h; H;
Y ; wg satisfying equations (5) ; (6) ; (27) ; (28) and the following rst order conditions with
regard to X and h:
U 0X
U 0C
=
( + + [+ (1  ) e (h; h; h)]  (s; s))
 (s; s)
wh (29)
U 0ht+1
U 0C
= (1  )Xwhe01(h; h; h) (30)
Following equations (28) and (29) ; it appears that the taxation of births increases the
marginal cost of quantity and increases the marginal benece of health expenditures.
3.2 The Social Optimum
For simplicity, f(X) = 1 is assumed. The Social Planner maximizes SU = U (C;X; h). He
holds a new maximization instrument s and he faces a new resource constraint:
C + s =

1 


 (s; s)
+ + e

X

Ah (31)
The optimal equilibrium now results from the maximization of the following objective
function with regard to X and h :
SU = U

1 


 (s; s)
+ + e

X

Ah  s;X; h

At the steady state s = s: The social planner determines the optimal health expenditures
by minimizing 
(s;s)
XAh + s with regard to s: Doing so, he equalizes the marginal social
20As mentionned in the Benchmark model, a higher child survival rate decreases the cost of quantity.
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cost of health spending (equal to one) to its marginal social cost. Obviously, the marginal
social benet of health spending is higher than the marginal private benece (calculated in
equation (28)): Formally, the optimal decision rule for s is:
1 =

hb01 + b02i
[ (bs; bs)]2 bXAbh (32)
Then the Social Optimum is described by the set
n bC; bX;bh; bso satisfying the equation
(31) ; (32) and the following conditions:
U 0X
U 0C
=

 +
h
+ e
bh;bh;bhi  (bs; bs)
 (bs; bs) Abh (33)
U 0ht+1
U 0C
= A
 bX  
 (bs; bs) + + ebh;bh;bh+ bh (be01 + be02 + be03)

  1

(34)
3.3 The Optimal Family Policy
An optimal policy has to make identical the systems f(32) ; (33) ; (34)g and f(28) ; (29) ; (30)g :
In consequence, the optimal scal scheme is:
b = 1  bX
h

(bs;bs) + + be+ bh [be02 + be03]i
 bXbhbe01 (35)b

= bebXhbe01

1  bX  
 (bs; bs) + + be  1 + "eh + "eh

(36)
br = 1  "(s;s)s
"
(s;s)
s +"
(s;s)
s

1 +
be(1  bX[ (bs;bs)++be(1+"eh+"eh)])bXhbe01

(37)
bt = "(s;s)s Abh (bs; bs) bX   Ah"(s;s)s (1  bX[ (bs;bs)++be(1+"eh+"eh)])"eh+1 (38)
The optimal values of b and b are the same as in the previous section (given that the
optimal values of bC; bX and bh have changed). It implies that proposition 1 still applies. In
other words, whatever the intensity of the Social Planners natalist bias, a policy of education
and health subsidies is optimal when it is completed with a family policy. Here, because the
Social Planner exhibits no natalist bias, the optimal family policy is always a tax on births.
The government budget constraint still has to be balanced by the implementation of a lump
sum tax on each family.
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Proposition 5 When the externality on health expenditures is strong such that "(s;s)s > ";
the optimal health policy consists in a subsidy.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that parental health expenditures are not optimal at
the competitive steady state.
At the competitive steady state (without taxation), (28) and (29) imply s = "(s;s)s AhN:
At the optimal steady state, (32) and (33) imply bs = h"(s;s)s + "(s;s)s iAhN: It follows
that s < bs: However s < bs does not ensure that health expenditures have always to be
subsidized. (32) and (33) indicates that the optimal value of health subsidies is:
br = 1  "(bs;bs)s
"
(bs;bs)
s + "
(bs;bs)
s
 
1 +
b

!
Then, br is positive if the following condition holds:
"
(bs;bs)
s > "
(bs;bs)
s
b

 "
When the externality on s is strong, parents tend to largely underinvest in health. Then,
health expenditures have to be subsidized. However, for a very high value of the education
subsidy relatively to "(s;s)s , health expenditures have to be taxed. This result comes from
the non linearity of the costs structure. Indeed, the existence of an externality on health
expenditures implies that parents does not internalize all the returns of their investment in
childrens health. The comparison of (28) with  = r = 0 and (32) indicates that health
expenditures at the competitive steady state are lower than at the optimal steady state.
However, when education is subsidized, a tax on births has to be implemented. Doing so,
the cost of quantity is increased relatively to the cost of health, then parents tend to increase
their health expenditures. The tax on births plays the role of an indirect subsidy on health.
Finally, the sign of br is determined by the di¤erence between the intensity of the externality
on health expenditures and the size of the indirect subsidy. If the externality on health is
relatively strong, the indirect subsidy will not be su¢ cient to reach bs; then br will be positive.
Conversely, if the externality on health is relatively weak, the indirect subsidy exceeds the
health subsidy that is really needed. So br will be negative: health expenditures will be taxed.
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To summarize, the present paper provides two results.. First, whenever it is optimal
to subsidize education and health, it is optimal to implement a family policy. This family
policy always consists in a tax on births because the Social Planner has no natalist bias.
Second, when the social returns on health expenditures are su¢ ciently high, the optimal
family planning program of the economy consists in the promotion of education and health
nanced by the taxation of births and a lump sum tax. This optimal policy has, in fact,
two main objectives. The rst one is to modify the parental trade-o¤ between quality
and quantity. More precisely, the government has to incite parents to transfer a part of
their spending on fertility toward education investments. The second objective is to modify
the parental trade-o¤ between fertility and health. In order to reach the same number of
surviving children, parents are incited to make less children in better health.
4 Some Empirical Issues At Stake
Countries which face over-population problems implement active policies to slacken their
population growth rate. Two examples are particularly enlightening: China and Sub-
Saharan Africa. If these two regions both face overpopulation problems, their family policies
have been sensibly di¤erent. In the light of the theoretical scal scheme proposed in this
paper, this section provides a brief reection on the improvements that could be leaded to
current policies experienced in these countries.
A recent report of the World Bank [2007] underlines that 31 of the 35 countries with
the highest fertility rates come from Sub-Saharan Africa. For the majority of them, fertility
rates have not changed over the last decades and are all greater than six children per women.
However the vast majority of these countries have implemented family planning programs
in collaboration with international organization like the World Bank.
The World Banks report [2007] underlines that the main factor of the high fertility rates
is the persistent high level of the desired number of children. In other words, the too high
fertility rates in Sub-Saharan Africa do not come from the lack of family planning program
disposal. It argues that e¤orts have to be done to reduce the desired fertility. To do so, it
recommends to forecast education and to improve the presence of health programs at the
local level. However, education indicators are all increasing since the sixties. More recently,
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the net primary school enrollment rate increased from 50 to 70 percent between 1990 and
2006. In the same period, the youth and adult literacy rates increased21. This sensible
improvement in education rates has not been su¢ cient to reduce fertility rates.
The present paper does not recommend to increase the amount spent in the family
planning programs. It proposes to complement family planning programs with taxes on
births helping to nance education and health. Without taxing births, these programs reduce
the net cost of the children quantity implying the persistence of a high desired number of
children.
Obviously, the Sub-Saharan African population puzzle cannot be reduced to a simple
model of fertility. More complex problems of political instability, starvation and HIV pan-
demy that are well beyond the scope of this paper, have a direct and signicant incidence
on fertility and education behaviors. It particularly questions the possibility to implement
taxes on births in a population that is largely engaged in an informal economy. However, the
increase of quantity costs has to be contemplated as an instrument of future family planning
programs.
China also implements a family policy to reduce its population growth rate. However, its
strategy di¤ers from the strategy of family planning programs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since
1980, China implements a One-Child policy which strongly constraints families fertility.
It consists in a system which provides large subsidies for the rst birth and imposes very
large taxes on the subsequent births. If parents decide to have a second child without being
allowed to do so, they lose a large part of their retirement pension, the integrality of their
child care helps and other social advantages. Furthermore, some physical sanctions have been
implemented in rural areas. This scal scheme is relatively di¤erent from the one proposed
in this paper. The Chinese policy does not tax all the births at the same rate. The rst
birth is subsidized whereas the subsequent births are largely taxed. The high level of the
tax on subsequent births is a very e¢ cient incentive to make only one child. Then the large
majority of families are subsidized to reach the target of one child per family. It implies
that the Chinese One-Child Policy is a very costly family policy. It cannot nance education
and health policies. Then, nothing ensures that the relative costs of education and health
21In Sub-Saharan Africa, the youth litteracy rate was 64% in 1990 and 73% in 2006. The adult litteracy
rate was 54% in 1990 and 61% in 2006. See appendix 1 for a more complete description.
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reach their optimal value. Indeed, a large literature underlines the insu¢ ciency of public
expenditures on health and education in Chinese rural areas where the large majority of
the population is concentrated (for example, see Kanbur & Zhang [2003] and Fan & Zhang
[2000]).
The results of the paper indicate that some marginal changes in the One-Child policy
could improve the overall e¢ ciency of the Chinese family planning policy. It proposes to tax
all births such that the family policy does not imply e¤ective costs. The amount saved by
the Chinese government could be invested in more ambitious education and health policies
reducing the large inequalities existing between urban and rural areas. Theoretically, this
system would not increase the overall cost of the Chinese family planning program and would
lead to the same fertility rates. However, it would increase health and education investments.
5 Conclusion
The present paper analyses optimal family policies in the standard model of trade-o¤between
quality and quantity. Given the non linearity of the parental budget constraint, to subsidize
education and health will be optimal if and only if a tax (or a subsidy) on births is also
implemented. Indeed, a subsidy on education reduces both the cost of education investment
and the total cost of fertility. This result still applies when the Social Planner does not su¤er
from a Natalist bias. Obviously, the model concludes that taxing births without nancing
education and health is not optimal either.
Finally, the scal scheme proposed in this model is quite simple: education and health ex-
penditures are promoted by the taxation of births and lump sum transfers. The implementa-
tion of this scheme could improve the overall e¢ ciency of actual family policies implemented
in China and Sub-Saharan Africa. The main objective of the present investigation was to
explore the family policy recommendations of the standard endogenous fertility model. As
a natural extension of this work, future research should integrate countriesspecicities to
make quantitative propositions of economic policy.
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